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This paper examines peace negotiations between the United States government 
and the Afghan Taliban insurgent group from 2001 to 2018. Although the U.S. 
government has attempted several times in the last 17 years to hold direct peace talks 
with the Afghan Taliban leaders to end the war in Afghanistan, no significant 
breakthroughs have been made. Every attempt to negotiate a political settlement has 
fallen apart. Different studies and reports largely consider the failures due to the 
Taliban’s lack of autonomy and authority in furthering the peace talks as well as 
Pakistan’s overwhelming influence on the insurgent group. This paper has used 
qualitative research analysis to examine how Pakistan’s security agencies have prevented 
the U.S.-Taliban peace negotiations from producing a tangible outcome and have caused 
the talks to fall apart when Pakistan was kept out of the negotiations and its strategic 
interests in Afghanistan were overlooked. This research confirms that the U.S. 
government focused excessively on negotiating directly with the Taliban leadership, who 
appeared to lack the authority and autonomy to strike a peace deal with the U.S. It also 
asserts that Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies maintain a significant amount of 
influence over the Taliban leadership and the insurgent group in general. A better 
understanding of the reasons for failures and shortcomings in the peace talks with the 
Taliban would contribute to the existing literature and help inform future peace 
negotiations with insurgent groups. 
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Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States’ military 
intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001 overthrew the Taliban regime in Kabul. 
With the Taliban gone, the U.S. poured billions of dollars in aid into the country to build 
everything from the ground up, including permanent government institutions, which were 
destroyed during the previous civil wars, but less effort was focused on reintegrating the 
remaining elements of Afghan Taliban into the Afghan society to prevent any potential 
resurgence of the group in the future. 
The newly liberated Afghanistan and the Afghan people experienced a few years 
of relative peace and stability before the misery returned. Although rumors of 
reemergence of Afghan Taliban had spread earlier, in 2006, the U.S. intelligence sources 
officially reported that the Taliban insurgency had returned and was growing, posing a 
great threat to peace and stability in Afghanistan.1 “An ever-more deadly insurgency with 
sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan, where leaders of the Taliban have found refuge” was 
growing rapidly.2 
Over the last 17 years, the U.S. government has attempted several times to hold 
direct peace negotiations with the Afghan Taliban leaders to end the longest running U.S. 
war in history, but no significant breakthroughs have been made. Every attempt to 
negotiate a peace accord, since 2001, has fallen apart prematurely. This research study 
will examine the U.S. peace talks with the Afghan Taliban insurgent group and factors 
that have prevented the talks from producing a negotiated settlement, resulting in 
1 Barnett Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror, (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 227. 
2 Ibid. 
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prolonged U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan. This research study is, therefore, 
guided by the following question:  
Why have U.S. peace negotiations with the Afghan Taliban constantly fallen apart?  
A better understanding of the reasons for failures and shortcomings in the peace 
talks with the Taliban would contribute to the existing scholarship and help inform future 
peace negotiations with insurgent groups.  
Historical Background 
This section will briefly describe Afghanistan, where the war has been going on 
for more than 18 years, and explain how the Taliban movement came into being and its 
relationship with Pakistan’s security agencies.  
Afghanistan 
 
Afghanistan officially appeared on the world map in 1774 after a Pashtun warrior, 
Ahmad Shah Durrani, conquered large portions of modern Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, 
and India and united the region’s desperate Pashtun tribes.3 “The graveyard of empires,” 
as Seth Jones of Johns Hopkins University has called it in his 2009 book In the 
Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, Afghanistan has historically been 
a fierce battleground for major empires and legendary conquerors, including Alexander 
the Great and Genghis Khan, who suffered staggering losses in their struggles to conquer 
and hold the region.4 In the first Anglo-Afghan war fought between 1839 and 1842, only 
a single soldier out of 16,000 British troops managed to escape alive out of Afghanistan. 
The Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 ended in defeat in 1989 with the 
3 “The World Factbook: Afghanistan,” CIA, accessed June 10, 2019, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook//geos/af.html. 
4 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 
2009), 25.   
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deaths of 15 thousand Soviet soldiers. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan significantly 
contributed to the later collapse of the Soviet Union. During the 10-year Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan, the Afghan Mujahidin received enormous financial support 
from the U.S. and many Arab countries, chiefly Saudi Arabia. This support was mostly 
channeled through Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).  
The Taliban and their Relationship with Pakistan  
 
The Taliban movement initially emerged as a small religious militia in the spring 
of 1994 in the district of Maiwand, west of Kandahar city, as an uprising against the strife 
inflicted on the region by the Mujahidin warlords. The group found early success clearing 
highways that connect Afghanistan’s Kandahar province to Quetta city, the capital of 
Pakistan’s Baluchistan province of highway extortionists.5 Mullah Mohammad Omar, 
who found early success in this campaign as a guard to an Islamic judge, would later 
become the Taliban’s supreme leader.6 After successfully clearing multiple checkpoints 
and disarming highway extortionists, the movement won great popularity and local 
support among ordinary Afghans and came to be known as Taliban, meaning “religious 
students” in the local language.7 As Carlotta Gall has noted, “although Pakistan did not 
create the Taliban, it acted swiftly to co-opt the movement,” and soon Pakistani 
intelligence advisors and commandos were spotted in Kandahar city and around Mullah 
Omar.8  
The Taliban’s swift and aggressive military campaigns from 1994 to 1996 left 
many in shock and awe. In just less than two years, they seized over 80 percent of 
5 Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America In Afghanistan 2001-2014, (New York, NY: Mariner Books, 
2015), 41. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid, 41-45. 
8 Ibid, 43-45. 
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Afghanistan. With support of Pakistani commando units and intelligence advisors, they 
crushed their opponents in fierce conventional battles.9 Behind the scenes, Brigadier 
General Sultan Amir Tarar (also known as Colonel Imam and Taliban’s Godfather), a 
senior ISI officer as well as Pakistani special force trainer, who had trained Mullah Omar 
during the Soviet occupation, was, in fact, the Taliban’s chief military commander.10 
Mullah Omar referred to him as “Ustad,” meaning “teacher” in the local language.11 
After seizing almost the entire country in 1996, the movement established the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Kabul. Of the three countries, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and United Arab Emirates that ever officially recognized the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, Pakistan was the first to do so and also the last to break official ties with the 
Taliban following the September 11th terrorist attacks. Historically, Pakistan has deep 
connections with Afghan Taliban, which go back several decades. Many Afghan Taliban 
leaders and co-founders, including the Taliban’s deceased leader, Mullah Omar, were 
part of the U.S.-backed Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979. They lived in Pakistan for many years where they were trained by Pakistani army 
and intelligence officers. Following the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul in 
1992, millions of Afghans, who sought refuge in Pakistan during the Soviet occupation, 
returned to Afghanistan, but most Afghan Mujahidin commanders and leaders remained 






                                                 
   The use of insurgency as a foreign policy tool became common during the Cold 
War era. Superpowers, including the United States and the Soviet Union, and regional 
powers such as China, South Africa, Ethiopia, Iran, and Pakistan are among the nation 
states that have supported insurgencies to further their political agendas and to promote 
their national security interests. The U.S., for instance, supported the Mujahidin in 
Afghanistan, Buddhist rebels in Tibet, and the contras in Nicaragua to contain the Soviet 
Union and the spread of communism. Conversely, the Soviet Union used communist 
insurgents in Vietnam, Cuba, Angola, and different other countries to promote their 
interests. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Cold War ended. The use of 
insurgency as a foreign policy tool, however, has still remained common in certain parts 
of the world and has largely replaced large-scale conventional wars that were once more 
commonly waged between nations states.  
A comprehensive research on “Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent 
Movements” conducted at the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center 
(ISDPC) states:  
Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward 
completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the 
use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. 
Insurgent activity—including guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political 
mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party 
organization, and international activity—is designed to weaken 
government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and 
legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their 
desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent 
groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not 
include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a  
given area or country.12  
 
12 Daniel Bayman, Trends In Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 
4. 
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The literature on insurgency is rich. The topic has been well researched over the 
last several decades. An analysis of 89 case studies conducted by the RAND National 
Defense Institute, titled “How Insurgencies End,” shows that modern insurgencies, on 
average, last around ten years. 12F13 They gradually fade away as they hit the ten-year tipping 
point, and chances of the government’s victory increases as insurgencies go beyond this 
time threshold. 13F14 According to the same study, “most insurgencies fail, since states, no 
matter how weak or feckless, are typically stronger, better organized, and more 
professional than nonstate forces.”14F15 The study has highlighted “Fidel Castro’s victory in 
Cuba, Mao Tse-tung’s in China...., and” the Afghan Mujahidin’s success in Afghanistan 
in 1992 as rare cases of successful insurgencies and notes that certain effective 
insurgencies, such as the ones listed above, have changed the course of history and have 
had major historical impacts on the world.15F16 Moreover, the study shows that complex 
insurgencies, in which multiple players are involved, such as the Taliban insurgency in 
Afghanistan, usually last longer than average, tend to be more violent, and, even after a 
protracted end, may reemerge due to a party’s dissatisfaction. 16F17 Contrary to the RAND 
study, a CIA analysis of 130 insurgencies since World War II shows that the average 
duration of the aforementioned insurgencies was more than 21 years, but it does not 
stipulate whether this estimation was true across the board, or covers a certain category of 
insurgencies, as the RAND study has underscored. 17F18         
13 Ben Connable, Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xii. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, 14. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid, xvi. 
18 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012,” Homeland Security Digital Library, accessed July 9, 2019, 
page 17, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=713599. 
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The RAND study considers state sponsorship to be a critical factor in the 
survivability of insurgencies.19 It further emphasizes that the “withdrawal of state 
sponsorship cripples an insurgency and typically leads to its defeat.”20 The study also 
highlights the importance of external sanctuary and suggests it increases chances of 
insurgents’ victory.21 A case study of insurgency in South Sudan appears to complement 
these findings. In 1991, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) controlled most of 
the oil-rich South Sudan territory except a few heavily guarded towns and was stretching 
into North Sudan.22 As soon as the insurgent group lost external support and sanctuary 
due to a political shift in Ethiopia, it began to significantly weaken and lost much of the 
territory it once controlled.23    
External sanctuaries, as the RAND study has underlined, seem to play a major 
role in keeping an insurgency alive and helping it drag on for many years. According to 
Thomas Hammes, a prominent counterinsurgency specialist, “[t]he greatest strength of 
the insurgent is the fact that he doesn’t have to win. He simply has to stay in the fight 
until (the coalition),” referring to the U.S. and its allied forces in Afghanistan, “gives up 
and goes home. By simply not losing, [insurgencies] compel their opponent to choose—
either continue to fight, perhaps indefinitely, or quit and go home.”24 The U.S. 
Department of the Army Counterinsurgency (COIN) Field Manual, has listed 
“diminishing support for insurgents and denying them sanctuaries” as the first and the 
19 Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xiii. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid, xvii. 
22 Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed 
Counterinsurgency Case Studies, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2010), 
98. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Thomas Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War In the 21st Century, (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 
2006), 183. 
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most important element of a COIN campaign,25 which largely supports Hammes’ 
assertion. From this perspective, it can easily be argued that a critical factor keeping the 
Taliban insurgency alive in Afghanistan for more than 18 years is the availability of 
sanctuaries and state support they enjoy in neighboring Pakistan. 
A CIA “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012” defines 
“[c]ounterinsurgency—frequently referred to by the acronym COIN—[as] the 
combination of measures undertaken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Effective 
counterinsurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, 
development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at 
weakening the insurgents while bolstering the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the 
population.”26  
The government of Sri Lanka, fed up with a violent insurgency conducted by the 
Tamil Tigers, also known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), launched an 
extensive COIN campaign in 2008 to crush the insurgents, and successfully wiped them 
out with military assistance from India.27 The Sri Lankan government’s COIN campaign 
was successful largely because the Tamil Tigers did not have an external hideout, only 
two major parties (the government of Sri Lanka and LTTE) were involved in the conflict, 
and neighboring countries denied the Tigers sanctuary.28 This case study demonstrates 
25 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency - FM 3-24 U.S. Army Field Manuals, (Washington, DC: 
Createspace Independent Pub, 2006) chapter 4, 7-8. 
26 “Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency 2012,” Homeland Security Digital Library, accessed July 9, 2019, 
page 1,   https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=713599. 
27 Azat Sajjad Khan, “Monograph: Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Operation During Eelam War IV: 
comparative analysis of Galula and Rajapaksa model to determine future applicability,” School of Advance 




                                                 
that insurgents without external hideouts are more prone to defeat, no matter how violent 
and well-organized they may be.   
In his 2009 book, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars In the Midst of 
a Big One, David Kilculen, one of the most prominent authorities on countering 
insurgencies, who has also served in Iraq and Afghanistan, critiques the assessments of 
other scholars who posit that an insurgency’s victory is largely based on its survival 
factor suggesting instead that the counterinsurgent force must be the one to hold out for 
the long-haul.29 To further support his argument, Kilculen quotes a U.S. Army officer in 
Afghanistan, who says “when you mix this sense of long-term commitment with a 
persistent-presence methodology, it becomes apparent to everyone that [we] are going to 
be in the town for a long, long time. The U.S. isn’t going away tonight and leaving the 
elders to cope with the Taliban on their own.”30  
Kilculen suggests that by sending out this message to “everyone,” including the 
Taliban and its supporters, the U.S. signals that it is not going to leave anytime soon and 
will stay in it for as long as it may take. This strong signal, Kilculen suggests, breaks the 
insurgents’ fighting morale, accelerating their fragmentation and defeat. This theory is 
similar to President Donald Trump’s new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia which 
he unveiled in August 2017. According to President Trump, it is “counterproductive…to 
announce in advance the dates we intend to begin, or end, military options.” He further 
emphasized that “[w]e will not talk about number of troops or our plans for further 
29 David Kilculen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars In the Midst of a Big One, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 95-96. 
30 Ibid. 
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military activities.”31 President Trump was apparently referring to President Barak 
Obama’s troops withdrawal announcement from Afghanistan in 2011.            
According to the RAND study, “[a]lthough a few 1960s-era insurgency theorists 
[have] underplayed the” critical role of sanctuary, “Mao…and most modern COIN 
theorists concur that insurgent sanctuary correlates with insurgent victory.”32 The study 
further asserts that “[t]he total absence of sanctuary leaves insurgents with only a one-in-
seven chance of winning.”33 The claim on importance of insurgent sanctuary is further 
illustrated in the following chart.   
 
Figure 1. Value of Sanctuary. 34 
The existing scholarship on insurgency is mostly focused on and considers, as 
noted in the literature review, state sponsorship and external sanctuary as two key 
elements of victory for insurgencies. Looking at the correlation between external hideout 
31 “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,” The White House, August 
21, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-
south-asia/. 
32 Ben Connable, Martin Libicki, How Insurgencies End, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 34. 
33 Ibid, 35. 
34 Ibid. 
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and insurgency and state sponsorship and insurgency, it is evident that chances of victory 
for insurgencies enjoying these two elements are higher, no matter how strong a military 
they face—be it a superpower, since both elements allow an insurgency to drag on the 
fight for many years, causing the counterinsurgent forces to lose both enormous resources 
and strategic patience.      
Following the end of the Second World War, a wave of horrific intrastate 
conflicts erupted. Between 1945 and 1999, compared to relatively few interstate wars, 
intrastate wars have been more common and have killed more people.35 For instance, in 
the Afghan civil war alone (1979-1989) around 2 million Afghans perished and three 
million more became refugees. Although the current conflict in Afghanistan is not listed 
in her long list of new civil wars, in her most recent journal article “The New New Civil 
Wars,” Barbara Walter, a prominent authority on civil wars, discusses a new wave of 
civil wars, which has started with the fall of Saddam Hussein.36 According to her, these 
post-2003, new civil wars are mostly fought in Muslim-majority countries “by groups 
that hold radical Islamist ideologies,” and, she warns, they “tend to last a long time” and 
may not end on the negotiation table.37 In the same paper, she also argues that “these civil 
wars are likely to resist negotiated settlements” due to lack “of a third party” guarantor 
“willing to commit long-term peacekeepers to help implement the deal.”38 Although she 
has excluded Afghanistan from this list, the on-going conflict in Afghanistan has a lot in 
common with what she has described as the new wave of civil wars.  
35 Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." The American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-90. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222. 
36 Barbara Walter, “New New Civil Wars,” Annual Reviews of Political Science 20, no. 1 (2017): 471, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-060415-093921.  
37 Ibid, 470. 
38 Ibid. 
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The Geneva Convention does not necessarily define the term civil war per se, but 
it does describe the criteria for civil war as follows:  
That the insurgents must have an organization purporting to have the 
characteristics of a State; that the insurgent civil authority must exercise 
de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory; that the 
armed forces must act under the direction of the organized civil authority 
and be prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war; that the insurgent 
civil authority must agree to be bound by the provisions of the 
Convention.39 
 
While James Fearon of the Stanford University defines civil war as “a violent 
conflict between organized groups within a country that are fighting over control of the 
government, one side’s separatist goals, or some divisive government policy,”40 a 
Department of Defense (DoD) field manual terms civil war as a “condition-based conflict 
beginning with an insurgency.”41 The DoD field manual further ads, “[o]nce the 
insurgency achieves certain characteristics of organization and resembles an alternate 
government, the conflict reaches the state of civil war.”42 In a separate research work 
“The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” Walter reiterates her point and states that 
“civil wars rarely end in negotiated settlement.”43 To support her claim, she reveals that 
between 1940 and 1990, 55 percent of interstate war ended on the negotiation table 
“whereas only 20 percent of civil wars reached similar solutions” during the same 
39 Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies - FM 3-24 U.S. Army Field 
Manuals, (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Headquarters, 2014) chapter 4, page 2, 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. 
40 James Fearon, “Civil war definition transcends politics,” Center for International Security and 
Cooperation, April 10, 2006, 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/civil_war_definition_transcends_politics_20060410. 
41 Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies - FM 3-24 U.S. Army Field 
Manuals, (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication Headquarters, 2014) chapter 4, page 2, 
https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. 
42 Ibid. 





                                                 
period.44 She strongly “argues that civil war negotiations rarely end in successful peace 
settlements because credible guarantees on the terms of the settlement are almost 
impossible to arrange by the combatants themselves” and “no state or international 
organization has shown any interest in providing this service.”45 Surprisingly, this 
argument flatly contradicts the on-going situation in Afghanistan, where the U.S. has 
largely played the role of a third-party guarantor and custodian of the peace process, but 
the peacemaking attempts have constantly fallen apart.      
Walter lists military stalemate between warring factions, power-sharing and, most 
importantly, third-party peacekeeping commitment as three major conditions necessary 
for civil war negotiations to produce a lasting peace.46 While she further argues that the 
peace keeping condition drops the likelihood “of going back to war somewhere between 
75 percent to 85 percent,47 Stephan Stedman highlights the importance of spoiler 
problems in peace processes. The conflicts of the past three decades, particularly the civil 
wars of the 1990s, and the scholarship on ending civil wars suggest that “peacemaking is 
a risky business”48 and “the greatest source of risk comes from spoilers—leaders, and 
parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power, 
worldview, and interest.”49 According to Stedman, “when spoilers succeed, as they did in 
Angola in 1992 and Rwanda in 1994, the results [were] catastrophic” and “the casualties 
of failed peace were infinitely higher than the casualties of war.” Immediately after Jonas 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, 3.  








                                                 
Savimbi’s refusal to accept the UN-monitored elections in 1992, around 300,000 people 
were killed in fresh conflicts in Angola, and after the “Hutu extremists in Rwanda 
rejected the Arusha Peace Accord in 1994 and launched a campaign of genocide, over 1 
million Rwandans died in less than three months.” 
Stedman divides spoilers generally into two categories: inside spoilers and outside 
spoilers. Inside spoilers, for instance, will comply to a certain level to demonstrate to 
others their willingness and good faith, but not to the extent to “weaken their offensive 
military capability.”50 Outside spoilers, however, will use tactics such as assassinating 
“moderates who stand for a negotiated peace” in order to undermine the peace process.        
A brief review of literature on civil war, particularly covering the period after the 
end of the Second World War, reveals that civil war peace negotiations are extremely 
challenging and require necessary conditions, as Walter has stated, to bring peace, but it 
specifically emphasizes that “third-party peacekeeping has a large, positive and 
statistically significant effect on the success of peace agreements in civil wars.”51 The 
literature also underscores the significance of spoilers and their management to ensure the 
success of peace negotiations as well as the duration of postwar peace. Whether call it 
insurgency or civil war, despite all peacemaking efforts, the conflict in Afghanistan has 
continued for more than 18 years, which has caused significant pain and huge economic 
loss without a clear end in sight.        
Hypotheses and Methods 
Hypotheses  
50 Ibid, 3. 




                                                 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): My initial hypothesis is that the Pakistani government is a 
major spoiler in the peace process in Afghanistan. My research into existing scholarship 
points to Pakistan’s role as a key spoiler in the Afghan peace process, which has led to all 
the past failures.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): I additionally hypothesize that Pakistan is willing to fund and 
abet the Taliban in perpetuity, undermining the U.S. peace efforts in Afghanistan.  
Both hypotheses are inspired initially by Barnett Rubin’s assertion that the 
Afghan Taliban leaders are “hostages to Pakistan military.”52 The initial hypothesis 
suggests that the Taliban leadership seemingly does not have the authority and autonomy 
to ink a peace deal with the U.S. unless Pakistan dictates it. The second hypothesis, 
which, I believe, is highly difficult to test and prove by empirical evidence largely due to 
the ISI’s highly deceptive maneuvers and the difficulty of accessing classified data, is 
also initially derived from Barnett Rubin’s assertion about the Taliban being hostages to 
Pakistan’s security agencies.  
Methods 
As part of this research study, I have reviewed strategies of three different U.S. 
administrations that have dealt with the Afghan war, starting with President Bush’s 
administration, which received authorization from the U.S. Congress to initiate military 
intervention in Afghanistan immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the U.S.53 I have also attempted to track different major developments in the 
Afghan peace negotiations from 2001 to 2018. This paper utilizes works of scholars and 
52 Barnett Rubin, “An Open Letter to the Taliban: An American who helped open secret negotiations with 
the group calls for them to accept a ceasefire and peace talks with the Afghan government,” The New 
Yorker, February 27, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-open-letter-to-the-taliban. 
53 “Authorization for Use of Military Force,” CONGRESS.GOV, September 18, 2001, 
https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ40/PLAW-107publ40.pdf. 
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experts who are well known authorities on Afghanistan. For instance, Barnett Rubin, a 
prominent source for this paper, was personally involved in peace negotiations and other 
dialogues with the Taliban even prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.54  
To better explain the relationship between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani 
government, I have consulted American, British, and Pakistani scholarly publications and 
assessments of leading experts and journalists on the Taliban insurgency and their 
connection with Pakistan’s security agencies. I also have looked through U.S. 
government reports and the analysis of several D.C.-based think tanks, including the 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), to observe different views and their assessments 
of the longest U.S. military engagement overseas. Lastly, I have carefully analyzed and 
tried to interpret an important letter from the Taliban addressed to the U.S. Congress and 
the American people, which was published in February 2018. The letter has highlighted 
some grim realities on the ground, which has listeners both in the U.S. and Afghanistan. 
Again, I have cautiously examined all the compiled material and have interpreted the 
content to test my hypotheses.     
An important limitation affecting my research is the lack of scholarly articles on 
the topic produced by an original audience, in this case, Afghans within Afghanistan 
analyzing the insurgency and the peace process from a local perspective. While several 
decades of civil wars have devastated almost all major government and economic sectors 
in Afghanistan, the education sector has suffered the most. Forty years of wars, internal 
migrations, and economic hardship have produced generations of unschooled Afghans, 
who, despite often having deep local understanding of the factors at play in the ongoing 
54 Barnett Rubin, “An Open Letter to the Taliban: An American who helped open secret negotiations with 
the group calls for them to accept a ceasefire and peace talks with the Afghan government,” The New 
Yorker, February 27, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-open-letter-to-the-taliban. 
 16 
                                                 
conflict and important insight into how it might best be resolved, often lack the literary 
capacity to share their knowledge with the international research community. 
Consequently, excluding the Taliban letter, almost everything I have researched on this 
project has been written by foreign experts, some of whom, I doubt, have ever seen or 
been to Afghanistan. I found it extremely difficult to locate any scholarly publications to 
back local approaches to solving the conflict and empirically prove it or test them as local 
approaches or ideas have rarely ever been documented or published.  
Data  
In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, President George W. Bush boldly 
stated that “no nation can negotiate with terrorists.”55 Despite the Afghan Taliban’s 
growing deadly insurgency, which by 2006 had gradually engulfed different corners of 
the country, the mantra of “no negotiation with terrorists” had dominated the U.S. 
military engagement in Afghanistan. During this period, less effort was focused on 
reintegrating the remaining elements of Afghan Taliban into the Afghan society. The few 
initiatives that were undertaken were often poorly coordinated and corrupt. For example, 
the UN-funded Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) 
program in 2006 ended disastrously because the then deputy defense minister of 
Afghanistan in charge of the program belonged to a Taliban-opposed  militia group 
(Northern Alliance) and had channeled most of the DDR funds to militiamen within his 
own circle.56  
55 Mona Sheikh, Maja Greenwood, “Taliban Talks: past, present and prospects for the US, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013, page 14, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/new-
diis-report-time-to-reconcile-with-the-taliban. 
56 Simonetta Rossi, Antonio Giustozzi, “Working Paper no. 2: Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: Constraints and Limited Capabilities,” Crisis 
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During the preparation phase for military intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. 
allied itself with several warlords in northern Afghanistan, many of whom had committed 
serious war crimes and grave human rights abuses against fellow Afghans, to help in 
toppling the Taliban regime in Kabul. Many of these warlords seized prominent 
government positions in the post-Taliban regime, where they continued their abuses, 
maintained private militias, and engaged in drug trafficking and other criminal activities. 
Most of these warlords were former Afghan Mujahidin commanders, who had torn apart 
the country in the civil wars following the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul 
in 1992. The U.S. partnership with such individuals and groups from the very beginning 
gave the Afghan people the impression that the U.S., possibly, tolerated corruption and 
promoted abusive warlords, which undermined the credibility of the new regime the U.S. 
had established in Kabul. The move was seen as a self-defeating act, which would cause 
lasting harm to peace and stability in Afghanistan.     
Under President Bush, the U.S. focused on a military solution to end the conflict 
in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration thwarted early peace talks in Afghanistan and 
refrained from engaging in dialogue with the Taliban.57 For instance, in December 2001, 
the Taliban approached the Afghan government with a signed letter from Mullah Omar to 
negotiate and peacefully lay down arms, but the U.S. refused to talk and hastily continued 
to advance on the Taliban’s stronghold in Kandahar province.58 In another instance, a 
year later, the Taliban representatives again approached the new U.S.-backed Afghan 
States Research Center, June 2006, page 4, http://www.lse.ac.uk/international-
development/Assets/Documents/PDFs/csrc-working-papers-phase-two/wp2.2-ddr-of-ex-combatants-in-
afghanistan.pdf. 
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government in Kabul to initiate peace talks, but the U.S. arrested the Taliban negotiators, 
including the Taliban’s former minister of foreign affairs, and sent them to Guantanamo 
Bay.59  
Barnett Rubin, one of the United States’ foremost authorities on modern 
Afghanistan, in his long letter to the Taliban, dated February 27, 2018, basically confirms 
all these missed opportunities for a political settlement in Afghanistan in late 2001 and 
2002. According to him, on December 6, 2001, a Taliban representative presented Mullah 
Omar’s signed letter to the then Afghan government leader, Hamid Karzai, and agreed to 
lay down arms in return for an amnesty, and did not even ask for a role in the new 
Afghan government. Despite this, president Bush’s secretary of defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld, “announced there would be neither a negotiated settlement nor an amnesty.”60  
Later in 2002, according to Rubin, the Taliban delegates again reached out to the 
Afghan government to take part in the “peace process, [but] Vice-President Dick Cheney 
ordered them imprisoned at Guantanamo or Bagram.”61 Rubin states that a year later the 
Taliban reached out to the U.S. Ambassador for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, to make 
peace with the government of Afghanistan, only for their request to be declined again by 
Washington.62 Rubin’s accounts show that the Bush administration repeatedly refused to 
engage with the Taliban in peace talks, which eventually forced the group to continue the 
war and pushed them to become “hostages to the Pakistan military.”63  
59 Ibid. 
60 Barnett Rubin, “An Open Letter to the Taliban: An American who helped open secret negotiations with 
the group calls for them to accept a ceasefire and peace talks with the Afghan government,” The New 
Yorker, February 27, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-open-letter-to-the-taliban. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Ibid.  
63 Ibid. 
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With the election of President Barak Obama in 2009, the U.S. strategy shifted, 
and it was proposed that the U.S. “reach out to moderate elements of the Afghan Taliban” 
for peace negotiations.64 To accomplish this, the administration appointed a special 
envoy for the Afghan peace and reconciliation process and dialogue with Afghan 
Taliban.65 The new strategy was met with mixed reactions. Some experts agreed that 
dialogue with Afghan Taliban should have been a part of the U.S. government’s 
counterinsurgency plan in Afghanistan since 2001, but it was hard to identify moderate 
Taliban elements, as the new strategy suggested. In any peace process, the issue of 
legitimate representation is of paramount importance. It can be almost impossible to 
achieve peace without individuals and groups considered as legitimate representatives of 
the warring factions. It is also equally important that participants at the peace negotiation 
table are genuine and have the authority and autonomy to agree and implement a peace 
deal. 
Many U.S. NATO allies had tried to reach out to different regional Taliban 
commanders since 2006 , but their efforts were not successful because it was difficult to 
identify who could actually speak on behalf of the Taliban leadership.66 While talks could 
possibly separate moderate Taliban from other extremists and global jihadists, there was 
difficulty determining who the moderate Taliban were because of the movement’s 
complicated structure and due to the fact that their political leaders were based in 
64 Mona Sheikh, Maja Greenwood, “Taliban Talks: past, present and prospects for the US, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013, page 14, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/new-
diis-report-time-to-reconcile-with-the-taliban. 
65 “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” The White House, March 
27, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-
afghanistan-and-pakistan. 
66 Jayshree Bajoria, “Six Experts on Negotiation with Taliban,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 20, 
2009, https://www.cfr.org/expert-roundup/six-experts-negotiating-taliban.  
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different Pakistani cities, and were out of reach.67 To address this complicated issue and 
to make sure the Taliban had a single, internationally known address and legitimate 
representation, the U.S. and Afghan government leaders jointly agreed to open a political 
office for the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, in January 2012.68 
President Obama officially approved the first secret memo on September 17, 
2010, authorizing U.S. government officials to open a direct negotiation channel with the 
Afghan Taliban.69 This led to the first direct meeting between the U.S. and the Taliban in 
Munich, Germany, reportedly involving a Taliban aid close to Mullah Omar.70 In late 
November 2010, the Taliban representative, Tayeb Agha, who had traveled from Qatar to 
Germany on a Pakistani passport to meet with American and German delegates, literally 
denied that the ISI knew anything about his travel or the meeting.71 Later on May 24, 
2016, a U.S. drone strike inside Pakistan killed the newly-appointed Afghan Taliban 
leader, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who had just replaced Mullah Omar after his death.72 He 
was on his way from Iran back to Pakistan. Reportedly, he, too, was travelling with a 
Pakistani passport, but what is even more important in this context is that he had used the 
same passport over a 10-year period of time and had conducted numerous international 
trips out of Pakistan.73  
67 Ibid. 
68 Mona Sheikh, Maja Greenwood, “Taliban Talks: past, present and prospects for the US, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan,” Danish Institute for International Studies, 2013, page 10, https://www.diis.dk/en/research/new-
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69 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars In Afghanistan and Pakistan, (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2018), 498.  
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72 Rosa Brooks, “The Magical Thinking of Killing Mullah Mansour,” Foreign Policy, May 24, 2016, 
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Although the Munich meeting was an important step in the Afghan peace process, 
it did not produce any tangible outcomes. The Taliban representative did not seem to 
have a broader agenda for peace negotiations with the Americans, as he only kept 
pushing for the release of several high profile, senior and junior Taliban detainees from 
Guantanamo without offering any perceived meaningful concessions or a roadmap for 
subsequent talks.74 This pointed to a lack of a clear commitment to peace and lack of a 
broader vision for future steps in the peace process.75   
To better facilitate the peace efforts in Afghanistan, the U.S. supported the 
Afghan government’s initiative to establish a High Peace Council (HPC) in October 2010 
to formally manage and facilitate the peace process and negotiations with the Afghan 
Taliban. Numerous scholars have underlined poor leadership and management of the 
process by the Afghan government. One scholar claims the HPC “failed to achieve any 
breakthrough in reconciliation with the insurgents.”76 He further claims that the HPC was 
incapable of managing the process and conducting productive talks with the Taliban 
because many in the HPC leadership were heads of current or former warring factions, 
who had fought with the Taliban in the past and had bitter war experience with each 
other.77 In fact, he categorizes the HPC itself as a major impediment to the peace process 
and further argues that the Taliban may never talk to an incompetent government body 
like the HPC.78  
74 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America’s Secret Wars In Afghanistan and Pakistan, (New 
York: Penguin Press, 2018), 506-507. 
75 Ibid, 506. 
76 Raja Muhammad Khan, Ajmal Abbasi, “The Afghan Peace Process: Strategic Policy Contradictions and 
Lacunas,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute xvi, no. 1 (Winter 2016): 70-73, http://www.ipripak.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/art4w16.pdf. 
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At the same time, a “peace brief” released by the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP) discusses similar concerns among Afghan citizens. Afghan analysts and 
representatives of different civil society networks have described the HPC members as 
war-waging experts rather than experts in furthering peacemaking efforts, and warn the 
appointment of those who have “committed war crimes and serious human rights 
violations” in the HPC leadership can only negatively impact the peace process.79 At 
least 53 out of 70 HPC members are heads or influential associates of certain violent 
political groups or illegal Afghan militias “involved in the civil wars of the 1980s-90s.”80 
The U.S. government has thrown tens of millions of dollars in support of this failed 
initiative, which has only helped undermine U.S. peace efforts in Afghanistan.81 As 
discussed earlier, the existence of many warlords and tainted figures in powerful 
positions in the Afghan government, particularly within the HPC, has continued to 
seriously challenge the peace process in Afghanistan and the credibility of the Council 
itself.       
Less than a year after the HPC was established, in September 2011, the Taliban 
assassinated the HPC chairman, who was the head of a warring faction during the Afghan 
civil wars and had also temporarily served as president of Afghanistan, following the 
collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul in 1992.82 Following the assassination of 
79 Patricia Gossman, “Peace Brief 74: Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect Afghan Civil Society,” 
United States Institute of Peace, January 10, 2011, page: 3-4, 
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United States Institute of Peace, January 10, 2011, page: 3-4, 
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81 “Report to the United States Congress,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 
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the chairman of HPC, the U.S. peace talks with the Taliban fell apart,83 and the prospect 
for peace and stability in Afghanistan dimmed for several years as the war continued. The 
Taliban showed little sign of interest in peace talks and ending the violence, while the 
U.S. seemed incapable of pushing the insurgent group to the negotiation table. After 
President Obama announced in 2011 that the U.S. troops would start pulling out of 
Afghanistan, the Taliban morale improved. Believing that, if they resisted a little more, 
they could wait out the U.S. forces, the Taliban fought harder, and made significant gains 
in the following years, bringing large parts of rural Afghanistan under their control.84 
Political turmoil in Afghanistan following the contested Afghan presidential elections in 
2014 and months of controversial political campaigns leading up to the 2016 presidential 
elections in the U.S. further hampered the U.S. war effort and reduced their negotiating 
position. 
President Donald Trump inherited the Afghan war in January 2017, and after 
months of consultations, on August 21, 2017, he announced a new strategy for 
Afghanistan and South Asia. The President bluntly called on Pakistan to stop sheltering 
the Taliban and militant groups who pose a threat to the U.S. national security, while, at 
the same time, floating the possibility of a negotiated end to the war in Afghanistan at an 
unspecified time.85 Not too long after President Trump announced the possibility of new 
negotiations, the Taliban published an open letter in February 2018, signaling a desire for 
83 Spencer Ackerman, “Inside the Secrete Taliban Talks to End America’s Longest War,” Daily Beast, 
August 2, 2018, https://www.thedailybeast.com/inside-the-secret-taliban-talks-to-end-americas-longest-
war?ref=scroll. 
84 Ben Farmer, “Barak Obama US troop withdrawal deadline a “boost” to Taliban,” The Telegraph, August 
27, 2010, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7967883/Barack-Obama-US-
troop-withdrawal-deadline-a-boost-to-Taliban.html. 




                                                 
direct peace talks and negotiations with the U.S. government. The Taliban have long 
expressed an appeal for direct peace talks with the U.S. government and have 
continuously refused to engage in peace negotiations with the government of 
Afghanistan, which they consider a puppet regime. The February 2018 Taliban letter, 
addressed to the American people and the U.S. Congress, suggests that Pakistan is likely 
determined to continue supporting the Taliban insurgency for a foreseeable future, or as 
stated in the letter, for “a hundred… years.”86 The Taliban letter likely suggests that 
under a potential Taliban regime in Kabul, the Afghan territory will not be used by 
terrorists against other countries and also hints at relieving the world of the Afghan poppy 
plague.  According to the Taliban’s letter, the U.S. military pressure, even if indefinite, 
will not change the situation on the ground.87 The Taliban’s letter further highlights 
serious issues to the American public such as the death of thousands of U.S. soldiers in 
the Afghan war, an 87 per cent increase in the production of heroin in 2017, and tens of 
billions of U.S. taxpayers’ dollars being wasted and given to “thieves and murderers.”88  
Following years of disappointments and missed opportunities, it looked as if the 
Afghan war was once again at a possible turning point. Calls for peace talks with the 
Taliban and an end to the war in Afghanistan through dialogue and diplomatic means 
once again gained some momentum. “It is time for this war in Afghanistan to end,” said 
General John Nicholson, the departing commander of the U.S. and NATO forces in 
86 “Taliban attempts to appeal to U.S. audience in new letter: Letter of the Islamic Emirate to the  
American People!.” The Washington Post, February 14, 2018, 
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Afghanistan.89 On September 4, 2018, two days after General Nicholson’s statement, the 
U.S. government officially announced the appointment of Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad 
as President Trump’s Special Representative for Afghanistan.90 Khalilzad, who is an 
Afghan-born American and previously served as U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and the United Nations under President George W. Bush, appears to be a great choice, 
particularly considering his background, the complex context of the war in Afghanistan, 
and the country’s tribal factionalism.91  
Pakistan immediately expressed negative reactions to Khalilzad’s appointment, 
perhaps, because he has been a vocal critic of Pakistan in the past over its support of the 
Afghan Taliban and other militant groups based in Pakistan.92 Despite this, his selection 
may prove to be a wise decision. Khalilzad is a Pashtun by ethnicity, the largest and most 
powerful ethnic group in Afghanistan, which includes nearly the entire Afghan Taliban 
leadership and fighting force. His Afghan roots and knowledge of the country and all the 
big players in Afghanistan may increase the chances for a breakthrough in his mission. In 
the meantime, by coincidence, the newly elected prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, 
is also a Pashtun, which can increase Khalilzad’s likelihood of getting along well with 
him. However, as observed in the country’s 71 years of existence, regardless of what 
Pakistan’s civilian government may say or promise, the Pakistani army can frequently 
supersede the will of the country’s civilian leadership.  
89 Mujib Mashal, “Time for this War in Afghanistan to End Says, Departing U.S. Commander,” The New 
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Historically, Pakistan has consistently denied having any degree of influence on 
the Afghan Taliban leaders and other Pakistan-based extremist groups. Despite this, 
evidentiary documents indicate that Pakistan has been misleading the U.S. and the 
international community about its support and influence over the Afghan Taliban and 
other Pakistan-based militant groups. For instance, in November 2008, after ten 
Pakistani gunmen launched a horrific attack on the Indian port city of Mumbai,93 
Pakistan denied any involvement. Despite the fact that the gunmen belonged to the 
Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Pakistan initially managed to 
convince the U.S. it had no connection to the attackers.94 The CIA, however, would 
later confirm the attack was actually directly coordinated by Pakistan’s intelligence 
agency, and the ten gunmen were effectively trained by the ISI inside Pakistan.95  
Multiple credible sources within the U.S. government, including the Directorate 
of National Intelligence (DNI), have repeatedly confirmed in their assessments that 
Pakistan supports the Taliban and has provided safe havens and sanctuaries not only to 
the Afghan Taliban, but also to many other militant groups based in Pakistan.96 These 
sources further state that Pakistan uses proxy warfare as a tool to further its strategic 
objectives in the region.97 Immediately after overthrow of the Taliban regime in Kabul 
in early 2002, Pakistan provided shelter to retreating Taliban leadership and fighters 
who were defeated and were on the run.98 The Pakistani president and military dictator 
93 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 44-45.  
94 Ibid, 45-47. 
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at the time, Pervez Musharaf, later repeatedly stated that this was done “in order to 
secure his country’s interests in Afghanistan.”99 
The Afghan peace negotiations in the past have been preposterous. Apparently, 
they were humiliatingly sabotaged by ISI because the U.S. and the Afghan government 
leaders attempted to keep Pakistan out of the negotiations. In November 2010, the British 
intelligence agency (MI6), in coordination with U.S. and NATO, flew an imposter 
multiple times from Quetta, Pakistan, to Kabul for peace talks and paid him large sums of 
money in the process.100 The person, who had posed as a senior Taliban leader, Mullah 
Akhtar Mansour, turned out to be a low-level shopkeeper in Quetta city, perhaps an ISI-
spoiler, and shortly disappeared with all the money.101  
In another instance in February 2010, in a staged operation, in which Pakistan 
deliberately asked for the CIA’s help on an alleged tip-off, the ISI arrested the second 
most senior Afghan Taliban leader and co-founder of the Taliban movement, Mullah 
Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, sitting in a madrassa in Karachi, Pakistan.102 The ISI had 
wanted to arrest Mullah Baradar because he had angered them by opening secret 
negotiation channels with senior U.S. and Afghan government officials in Kabul. ISI 
knew his whereabouts, but staged his arrest in a manner to both gain U.S. trust and also 
lock up the defecting Taliban leader.103 Although the arrest created some optimism in the 
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Pakistan, it was immediately clear that this was a deliberate act of sabotage by ISI.104 The 
Mullah Mansour arrest shut down a very crucial covert negotiation channel with the 
Afghan Taliban.105 In doing this, Pakistan was likely signaling that direct talks with 
Afghan Taliban leaders cannot occur without Pakistan’s permission and without taking 
into account Pakistan’s vested interests in Afghanistan.106 
Similar incidents have also been documented in which key Taliban leaders and 
senior members of the movement, who were inclined to make peace with Kabul or 
secretly attempted to talk to U.S. and Afghan government officials, were either 
incarcerated in Pakistan or forced underground for unknown periods of time. As Seth 
Jones has documented, another key Taliban leader, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the 
Taliban’s former defense minister, was reportedly captured by Pakistani forces inside 
Pakistan in 2007.107 His arrest made international headlines, but yet again, says Jones, 
Mullah Obaidullah was able to continue interacting with other Taliban leaders.108 
Furthermore, an assessment conducted by the United Nations (UN) and the European 
Union (EU) has drawn a grim conclusion regarding ISI’s involvement in the Afghan war 
and its strong influence on the Taliban leaders. The study stresses that “[g]iven the wide-
ranging nature of ISI involvement, [the ISI] would need to endorse any talks with the 
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Taliban. Anyone negotiating without their sanction would have to do so covertly or face 
heavy consequences.”109 
By repeatedly sabotaging the peace talks, perhaps, Pakistan is potentially trying to 
communicate to the U.S. that “you are doomed without us, and if you don’t manage 
Afghanistan while accommodating our core interests, you will fail.”110 From this 
perspective, the February 2018 letter from the Taliban, in fact, could be considered a 
positive gesture and a green light from Pakistan, indirectly stating they want to help with 
the peace process in Afghanistan if they can secure Pakistan’s interests. Historically, 
since its inception in 1947 to date, Pakistan’s survival has depended, at various times, on 
generous U.S. aid (both military and economic). As much as the government of Pakistan 
may dislike the U.S. for not siding with them in their multiple wars with India, not 
resolving the Kashmir dispute in Pakistan’s favor,111 and overthrowing their client regime 
in Afghanistan (Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) following the September 11th 
attacks, they highly appreciate the easy U.S. military and economic grants. In the last 18 
years alone, the U.S. has given $33.4 billion in aid to Pakistan, much of which came in 
the form of grants that will never have to be paid back.112  
No other country has ever been so generous to Pakistan. And, no matter how close 
the current Pakistani relationship with regional U.S. adversaries, China and Russia in 
particular, may appear to be, the type of close relationship they have enjoyed and 
nurtured with the U.S. government, specifically with the Pentagon and the CIA, will not 
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be easily replicated. Pakistan has worked on some economic initiatives with China, but, 
as observed, Pakistanis are distrustful of Chinese loans because they consider them a trap, 
which could eventually turn Pakistan into a Chinese colony.113 Under the 2013 China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) program alone, China invested over $50 billion (in 
loans) in major infrastructure projects in Pakistan.114 Pakistan will have to reimburse 
China over $90 billion in the next 30 years with accumulated interest.115 Pakistan is 
already late in making its estimated average $3 billion annual payback installments to 
China and had been seeking loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other 
friendly nations to pay the Chinese debt.116  
In the Taliban open letter, Pakistan may be indirectly suggesting that an 
Afghanistan under the Pakistan-backed Taliban regime can be poppy free, a major goal of 
both the U.S. and the international community in Afghanistan. There is credible evidence 
to back this claim. Based on a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
report,117 and according to a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent, who visited 
Afghanistan under the Taliban in 2001, a single Taliban crackdown eliminated the 
world’s largest poppy industry in less than a year.118 Conversely, while the U.S. has spent 
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over $8.88 billion in its counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan since 2002,119 the 
country’s opium production has seen an unprecedented growth in the last 17 years. It rose 
to an all-time record high (9,000 tons) in 2017, which was estimated to generate between 
$4.1 to $6.6 billion locally and $28 billion in international markets.120         
  
 
Figure 2. "GDP, by value added of the agriculture sector and other sectors, and estimated gross 
value of opiate export, Afghanistan, (US$ billion) 2000-2017.”121 
 
 
Figure 3. "Table 11 estimated share of opium production available for heroin production."122 
 
119 “October 30, 2018 Quarterly Report to Congress,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 
Reconstruction, accessed June 10, 2019, page 3, https://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/. 
120 “Afghanistan opium survey 2017,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed June 10, 2019 
page 44, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Opium-survey-peace-security-web.pdf. 
121 Afghanistan opium survey 2017,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, accessed June 10, 2019, 
page 14, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Opium-survey-peace-security-web.pdf. 
122 Ibid, 44. 
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The second claim in the letter is equally compelling. A large portion of the 
billions of U.S. aid and reconstruction funds to Afghanistan never made it out of Kabul to 
help change the lives of ordinary poor Afghans. Instead, funds were embezzled by the 
very warlords and criminals the U.S. government partnered with and propped up as part 
of the new government in post-Taliban Kabul.123 These “thieves and murderers,” as 
stated in the letter, not only stole most of the reconstruction funds for Afghanistan, but 
their criminal activities helped significantly discredit the U.S.-backed Kabul regime and 
sabotaged many U.S. peace and development efforts in the country. These former 
warlords reportedly engaged in a litany of crimes from kidnapping, rape, intimidation, 
drug trafficking,124 illegal mining, and selling the U.S.-donated Afghan National Army 
ammunitions, weapons, Humvees and other military equipment in the black market and 
to the Taliban.125  
The third and perhaps boldest statement in the letter likely implies that Pakistan is 
determined to continue supporting the Taliban insurgency for many, many years to come, 
and that U.S. and Afghan security forces will not be able to break it. The claim suggests 
the U.S. may choose to stay in Afghanistan and fight the Taliban for another two decades 
or more in the hope to force the Taliban to renounce violence, lay down arms, and 
reconcile with the Afghan government, but with sanctuaries in neighboring Pakistan and 
strong support of Pakistan’s military and intelligence agency, this outcome would merely 
remain a hope.  
123 John Tierney, “Warlord, Inc.: Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan,” 
United States House of Representatives, accessed June 15, 2019, page: 1-5, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/HNT_Report.pdf. 
124 John MacKenzie, “Life under the Taliban,” Public Radio International, August 7, 2009, 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2009-08-07/life-under-taliban. 
125 Austin Bodetti, “How the U.S. Is Indirectly Arming the Taliban,” The Diplomat, June 13, 2018, 
https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/how-the-us-is-indirectly-arming-the-taliban/. 
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“A review of insurgencies since World War II suggests that insurgent groups like 
the Taliban, which retain a sanctuary in neighboring states, either win insurgencies or 
successfully drag them out for years and decades,” says Seth Jones, adjunct lecturer of 
strategic studies at Johns Hopkins university. 126 He further adds, “despite tough talk from 
Washington, Taliban leaders continue to enjoy a sanctuary in Pakistan and support from 
Pakistan’s security agencies,” which is something Pakistan has consistently denied.  
Discussion 
This research study suggests that the U.S. government focused excessively on 
negotiating directly with the Afghan Taliban leaders to end the conflict, while, as 
underlined by several credible sources consulted in the study, the Taliban leaders 
appeared to lack the authority and autonomy to enter into a peace deal with the U.S. As 
one UN and EU reported noted, “the ISI would need to endorse any talks with the 
Taliban.”127 The U.S.-Taliban talks were consistently sabotaged by the Pakistani security 
agencies, when Pakistan was left out of the negotiations. Pakistan also incarcerated and 
forced underground the Taliban leaders who were inclined to make peace or attempted to 
open backchannel talks with the U.S. and Afghan government officials. Multiple other 
sources, compiled in the data section, also disclosed that Pakistan’s security agencies 
have strong influence on the Taliban leadership and the insurgent group in general. This 
strong influence has taken away the Taliban’s autonomy and authority in the peace talks 
and prevented the group’s leaders from signing a peace deal with the U.S. These findings 
are largely consistent with my first hypothesis stating that the Pakistani government is the 
126 Seth Jones, “The Insurgent Sanctuary in Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
September 11, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/insurgent-sanctuary-pakistan. 
127 Seth Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan, (New York, NY: W.W. 
Norton, 2009), 266. 
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primary and major impediment to the peace process in Afghanistan. The U.S.-Taliban 
peace talks have failed in the past largely because Pakistan has sabotaged almost every 
attempt the U.S. made to negotiate directly with the Taliban leaders.  
Additionally, a review of insurgencies also indicates that insurgent “groups like 
the Taliban, which retain a sanctuary in neighboring states, either win insurgencies or 
successfully drag them out for years and decades.”128 Also, as underscored in the 
literature review, the existing scholarship on insurgency considers external sanctuary and 
state sponsorship as two key elements of success for an insurgency and the Taliban have 
been enjoying both these elements since the beginning of the U.S. military intervention in 
Afghanistan in 2001. Essentially, it suggests that no matter how strong the 
counterinsurgent force, with external sanctuary and strong state support an insurgent 
movement can survive and drag out the conflict for many, many years.   
According to the Taliban’s letter of February 2018, the U.S. military pressure, 
even if indefinite, will not change the situation on the ground.129 The Taliban letter 
suggests that Pakistan is likely determined to continue supporting the Taliban insurgency 
for a foreseeable future, or as stated in the Taliban’s letter, for “a hundred… years.” 
These findings are in tune with my second hypothesis, which states that Pakistan is 
willing to fund and abet the Taliban in perpetuity. Pakistan has funded and supported the 
Taliban insurgency for almost two decades and may continue to do so for another two 
128 Seth Jones, “The Insurgent Sanctuary in Pakistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
September 11, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/insurgent-sanctuary-pakistan. 
129 Taliban attempts to appeal to U.S. audience in new letter: Letter of the Islamic Emirate to the American 




                                                 
decades or for as long as it would take the U.S. to eventually run out of patience and 
resources, give up and withdraw its troops from Afghanistan.  
Based on the overall findings of this study, mainly emphasizing that the Taliban 
cannot be overwhelmed militarily, largely due to Pakistan’s strong support and the 
sanctuary it has provided to the insurgent group, it is recommended that the U.S. should 
reach a political settlement directly with Pakistan’s military and the ISI to end the 
conflict. Without Pakistan’s consent, there will likely be no peace in Afghanistan no 
matter how many more years or decades the conflict goes on. The U.S. must find 
common grounds with Pakistan and must seek direct talks with the Pakistani security 
agencies, who provide critical backing to the Taliban and literally run the insurgency. 
The Taliban movement, as noted in the study, is fundamentally dependent on support 
from Pakistan. Why should the U.S. hold direct talks with the Taliban leaders and not 
with the state directly sponsoring them? As Barnett Rubin put it, the Taliban leaders are 
“hostages to Pakistan military.”130 They basically do not have the authority to make 
peace or war. They will do what is dictated to them. Theoretically, in a hostage situation, 
negotiators talk to the hostage taker to end the crisis, not to the hostages. 
The U.S. and Pakistan militaries and lead intelligence agencies (CIA and ISI) 
have enjoyed very close partnerships in the past. As noted in the brief description of 
Afghanistan’s history in the beginning of the study, the CIA and ISI’s Cold War 
partnership (the U.S. support for Afghan Mujahidin through ISI to bleed the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan), for instance, resulted in the defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan and 
significantly contributed to the later collapse of the Soviet Union. This indicates that 
130 Barnett Rubin, “An Open Letter to the Taliban: An American who helped open secret negotiations with 
the group calls for them to accept a ceasefire and peace talks with the Afghan government,” The New 
Yorker, February 27, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/an-open-letter-to-the-taliban. 
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there is precedent for U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in the region and, that with sufficient 
political will, the U.S. could theoretically partner with Pakistan again to end the Taliban 
insurgency.  
After almost two decades of war (for Americans) and almost half a century of 
conflicts and miseries (for Afghans), peace is apparently the most important objective for 
both nations. If Pakistan can deliver it in the form of a moderate Taliban regime, it can 
most likely be acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Afghans and Americans. The 
U.S. must obtain written commitments from Pakistan on major issues including 
preserving the key gains of the last 18 years and preventing the potential use of Afghan 
soil by terrorists. Further protracting the Afghan war will only lead to more deaths, 
exacerbate economic hardship, and further de-stabilize the region. Given that the U.S. 
already works with and, in some cases, is already allied to extremely conservative Islamic 
nation states like Saudi Arabia over matters of national security, it should absolutely be 
possible to maintain friendly ties with a moderate Taliban regime in Kabul in order to 
secure U.S. national security interests in the region.   
Conclusion 
This research study explored and examined the discourse surrounding the U.S. peace 
negotiations with the Taliban insurgent group from 2001 to 2018, contributing to the 
overall literature on the Afghan peace process. Analysis of the U.S.-Taliban peace 
negotiations confirmed that Pakistan is the primary impediment to the peace process in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan has vested interests in Afghanistan and has used manipulative 
tactics to undermine the U.S. peace efforts in the country. The research also confirmed 
that Pakistan is likely determined to continue providing sanctuary and support to the 
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Taliban insurgency for a foreseeable future, which increases the insurgent group’s 
chances of victory in the battlefield. These findings are consistent with and create support 
for the existing literature on the Afghan peace process, which broadly describes 























Appendix A – Key excerpts from the Taliban letter 
Excerpt from page 1: 
 
“Letter of the Islamic Emirate to the American people! The American people, officials of 
independent non-governmental organizations and the peace loving Congressmen!  
 
With the hope that you will read this letter prudently and will evaluate the future of 
American forces and your profit and loss inside Afghanistan in light of the prevailing 
realities alluded to in the following lines!”  
 
Excerpt from page 3:  
 
“Production and expansion of narcotics:  
 
The third justification of George W. Bush to invade Afghanistan was the prevention and 
eradication of narcotics. Let us examine the amount and levels of production and 
expansion of the narcotic trade in Afghanistan after seventeen year war effort?  
According to the data provided by UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crimes) – prior to the American invasion – poppy was cultivated only on 185 hectors 
land of Afghanistan and only in areas controlled by anti-Taliban forces whereas the level 
of heroin addiction among Afghans was next to nil. But following the American invasion 
of Afghanistan, poppy cultivation skyrocketed from 185 hectors to 328,000 hectors while 
under the shadow of seventeen year occupation, the number of drug addicts has reached 3 
million people. On 21st December 2017, the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crimes) reported that drug production increased by 87% and poppy  
cultivation increased by 63% during the year 2017, thus mounting the total production of 
narcotics to 9000 metric tons.”  
 
Excerpt from page 4: 
 
“The American people!  
 
You proclaim to be a developed and civilized nation of the world. Since the imposed 
government in Afghanistan is established by you therefore we leave it to your judgment 
to decide – according to your logic and conscience – whether the present system and its 
pertinent changes, insecurity, chaos and 87% increase in narcotics are reforms or crimes 
against humanity?  
 
Your authorities proclaim that tens of billions of dollars have been spent on various 
reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Of course this is the same money which is 
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collected from you as taxes and revenues, but here it has been distributed among thieves 
and murderers. Do you agree that the hard earned money of your labor should be wasted 
on such a corrupt system where in only one criminal case, $900 million were stolen from 
Kabul Bank by corrupt officials?  
 
Do you consider it the rule of law in American culture and lexicon where the first deputy 
of a government is a person involved in the felonious act of sexual assault on a 70-year-
old man besides hundreds of other crimes against humanity? Is this the civilization, 
modernity and rule of law proclaimed by you in the world? Were your 3546 forces killed 
in Afghanistan to establish and empower such a system? Can your scholars, intellectuals 
and unbiased analysts produce an answer to our questions?  
 
You must understand that our people are living, watching and closely analyzing all these 
calamities and that is why the regime working under the shadow of your military support 
and the corrupt elements assembled therein are not looked upon as a legitimate 
government rather they are considered a band of usurpers, looters, mafia warlords and 
drug-dealers while at the same time, the resistance against them is considered their legal, 
moral and national obligation. The people working alongside you to impose this system 
are committing treason against our nation and national interests.”  
 
Excerpt from page 8: 
 
“The Islamic Emirate had asked America from the very beginning to solve her issues 
with the Islamic Emirate through talk and dialogue. The use of force has adverse 
consequences, and you might have now discerned the bitter consequences of American 
aggression against Afghanistan. If the policy of using force is exercised for a hundred 
more years and a hundred new strategies are adopted, the outcome of all of these will be 
the same as you have observed over the last six months following the initiation of 
Trump’s new strategy.  
 
According we still believe that it is not too late for the American people to understand 
that the Islamic Emirate – as representative of its people – can solve its problems with 
every side through healthy politics and dialogue. Needless use of force only complicates 
the issues by creating new dimensions which gradually move out of the realm of control. 
The Islamic Emirate is a regional power with deep roots which cannot be subdued by 
sheer force. The chances of dialogue however are not exhausted. The American people 
must understand that the Islamic Emirate understands its responsibility and can play a 
constructive role in finding a peaceful solution for issues but this can never mean that we 
are exhausted or our will has been sapped. It is our policy that logic should be given a 
chance before the use of force. Whatever can be achieved by logic, should not be 
relinquished due to the use of force. It is the moral obligation of the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan to inform you, the American masses, about these realities.”  
 
Excerpt from page 9: 
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“It is worth mentioning that we have no agenda of playing any destructive role in any 
other country and we have practically proven over the past seventeen years that we have 
not interfered in any other country. Likewise we will not allow anyone else to use Afghan 
territory against any other country. War is imposed on us, it is not our choice. Our 
preference is to solve the Afghan issue through peaceful dialogues.  
 
After gaining independence, we would like to have positive and constructive relations 
with all countries of the world including our neighboring countries. We welcome their 
assistance and support in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of our country.”  
 
Excerpt from page 10: 
 
“In brief, insisting on prolonging the war in Afghanistan and maintaining American troop 
presence is neither beneficial for America nor for anyone else, rather it endangers the 
stability of the entire world. This is irrefutable reality which is only rejected by your 
arrogant authorities. If you want peaceful dialogue with the Afghans specifically and with 
the world generally, then make your president and the war-mongering congressmen and 
Pentagon officials understand this reality and compel them to adopt a rational policy 
towards Afghanistan!  
 
This will be the most constructive step for the stability of your people, the Afghans as 
well as the whole world.  
 
Our only obligation is to convey (the message) to you!  
 
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan  
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